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Abstract:
This paper provides a critical review of competition policy in Switzerland.  We analyse the legal
statute, the institutional arrangements for its implementation and the case law since 1985.   We find
that Cartel Commission which was given wide discretion by the law has been relative immune from
judicial and political challenge and vulnerable to interest groups. The analysis of the relevant markets,
the evaluation of dominance and that of countervailing benefits tend to be poorly motivated. In
addition, the concept of effective competition, which is central to the implementation of the law, has
not been substantiated by the case law. Accordingly, the decisions tend to be highly judgmental,
which reflects the weak  accountability of the Commission.  Fortunately,  both the substantial
provisions of the law and the institutional framework have been improved by the recent revision of
the statute.  Being more accountable, the Commission may not have the choice but to improve its
practice.
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Non technical summary
 The first part of this paper discusses the main provisions of the Swiss competition statute.  We argue
that the statute has evolved from a weak to a potentially more restrictive instrument, which is now
close to the EC framework.  The central role given to the potentially elusive concept of effective
competition in the Swiss law is the main feature of differentiation with the EC law.   Effective
competition is seen as a threshold beyond which restrictions of competition are without redemption
(i.e. cannot be balanced by efficiency benefits).   The case law however fails to bring  the concept to
life and in our view should be downplayed in  further implementation of the law.
Turning to the institutional setting established under the 1985 law, we observe that the Cartel
Commission operated with wide discretion (stemming mostly from general substantive legal
provisions) and little threat of judicial and political challenge.  In addition, the composition of the
Cartel Commission, populated with representatives of various interest groups with no obvious
interest in competition, made it potentially vulnerable to direct outside pressure.   Economic expertise
was not enhanced by this composition.   The analysis of the case law supports the conjecture that the
Cartel Commission was indeed weakly accountable; in various dimensions (definition of relevant
markets, evaluation of dominance, evaluation of countervailing benefits, imposition of remedies), the
analysis is rather poor by the standards of other jurisdictions.    Its lacks organising principles, fails to
bring appropriate evidence and often relies on highly judgmental evaluations.  Surely, if the
Commission had been accountable, it would felt compelled to back up its cases.  In the event,
judgements sufficed.
We find no evidence that the decisions of the Cartel Commission have been closely associated with
the views of particular interest groups.  Rather, we find that the Commission may have used the
absence of appropriate checks and balances to pursue a somewhat unorthodox « policy towards
competition ».   In importance instances, as revealed by the case law, the Commission has attempted
to introduce competition in the Swiss economy, even though there was no clear anti-trust issue in the
cases at hand.    As it turns out, given the highly cartellised structure of the Swiss economy,
consumers may have benefited from this policy.  Nevertheless, the legal and institutional framework
have been used to pursue objectives that were beyond those normally assigned to a competition
agency.
The recent revision of the law and institutions for its implementation go a long towards improving
accountability and reducing the vulnerability of the Competition Commission to outside pressure.
Faced with significant threats of judicial (and political) challenge, the Commission will presumably be
led to improve on its analysis and to interpret its role more narrowly.4
0. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyse competition policy in Switzerland. We consider several
benchmarks against which the policy will be analysed.  First, we will, to the extent possible, compare
the Swiss practice with that followed in other jurisdictions.  Second, we will evaluate the economic
analysis on which the policy is determined on a case by case basis.  Finally, we will study whether
the policy is applied consistently across cases.
The first section of the paper reviews the main provisions of the Swiss competition statute
emphasising their evolution over time and comparing them with other legal frameworks at the level of
the EC and of  member states with a substantial tradition in competition policy (namely the UK and
Germany).    This analysis covers the substantive provisions of the law but also the procedures and
institutions that the law establishes for implementation.
As often, however,  much of the policy arises from the case law, which is analysed in the second
section.  The analysis of the statute in the first section serves to highlight a number of features of the
current legal framework which deserve particular attention in the analysis of the case law.
The second section  focuses on the concept of effective competition, the balance between
competition and efficiency, the analysis of markets and competition undertaken by the Commission,
the remedies it has imposed and the balance between  market power and fairness in Commission’s
decisions (recommendations).
The scope of our analysis should be clarified from the outset.  In what follows, we focus on the
implementation of the main statute which governs competition policy (namely the « cartel law »).
Neither the law on price control (« Surveillance des prix ») nor the law on unfair business practices
are considered in detail.    If the latter is fairly standard by comparison with other developed market
economies (it deals mainly with false or misleading advertising), the former is highly unusual.   As
such, it would be the subject of  a separate analysis.5
One may wonder whether a review of Swiss competition policy at this point in time is really
appropriate given that a new law has just been passed.  One might argue that the experience of the
previous law offers little guidance about the functioning of the current law, so that our analysis is
mainly of historical interest. We will argue however that the new law has inherited from its
predecessor a number of key characteristics which will remain central to the implementation of the
policy (in particular the concept of effective competition and the evaluation of countervailing
benefits). Furthermore the civil servants enforcing the old law (essentially the staff of the former
« Cartel Commission ») will also be the ones responsible for implementing the new one, so some
continuity in their approach to the analysis of markets can be expected.    As a result, a close analysis
of past practices should help in evaluating and making recommendations for improving the
implementation of the current framework.   This prospective will also enable us to identify a number
of  issues in the previous statutes which have not been properly addressed by the recent revision.
1. The Swiss competition statute - a comparative analysis
The principle of freedom of contract is deeply rooted in the Swiss constitution so that making
particular contracts unlawful requires a strong legal basis.   Art 3.1 provides such a constitutional
basis for introducing a cartel law.  Its second paragraph states that the Federal government may,
when it is the general interest, pass laws to curb the negative social and economic consequences of
cartels and analogous organisations. This approach suggests that a general cartel prohibition (similar
to that found in the German law) would be very difficult to introduce in Switzerland (barring a change
of the constitution).
By comparison with Germany or the UK, Switzerland was also quite late in introducing any kind of
competition law. The first law was not introduced until 1962. It has since been subject to two
(major) revisions, the first in 1985 and the second in 1995.   We will argue in this first section, that in
very broad terms the evolution of the law could be characterised as a progressive shift from a very
weak to a more restrictive statute, which is now reasonably close to EC standards.
We shall first review the substantive provisions of the law (in its various versions) before commenting
on the institutional arrangements for its implementation.6
1.1 Substantive provisions
1.1.1.  The scope of the law
Unlike European competition statutes which introduced (back in 1959) a different treatment for
agreements between undertakings (art 85 of the Treaty of Rome) and abuse of dominant positions
(art 86), the original competition statute in Switzerland (cartel law of 1962) make no such distinction.
It has “ cartels and analogous organisations ” as an single object, which includes agreements (art 2)
as well as dominant firms (art 3).     This encompassing definition was  kept in the first revision of the
law (in 1985) but abandoned in the recent revision (1995).  The most recent law (95) adopts the EC
approach by offering a different treatment for agreements (art 5) and dominant firms which abuse
their position (art 7).   This revision has also broadened the scope of the statute by introducing
provisions on mergers (section 2). Indeed it was felt that a competition policy which controls cartels,
but cannot prevent dominant positions to be attained through mergers1  was inadequate2.  Since the
EC currently also has its own statute with respect to mergers (regulation 4064/89) the scope of EC
and Swiss law are similar in terms of broad categories. As indicated below, there are however still
significant differences between Swiss and EC law regarding the precise definition of cartels, abuses
and mergers that are covered by the statute.
In terms of geographical scope, the original (62) law explicitly excluded export cartels. However this
provision has been omitted from the first (85) and second (95) revisions.   Still, to the best of our
knowledge,  there has not been any case where a cartel has been challenged on the basis of effects
that it had abroad.
Regarding cartels in foreign countries,  an early ruling by the federal court has clarified that the law
was applicable as long as the effects (of cartels or abuses) were felt in Switzerland (see Carron,
                                                                
1 The Cartel Commission could only react to mergers ex post, on the basis  of an abuse of dominance.  This
situation was similar to that prevailing in the Community before the merger regulation.
2 The rapid concentration of the Swiss cement industry after the cement cartel was banned illustrates the
weakness of such an arrangement.7
1994)3.  This approach is similar to that adopted in the Community (see for instance the court
decision on "Wood pulp").  In the recent (95) revision of the law, the approach has been made
explicit in art 2 § 2.
Overall, this suggests that the activities of Swiss cartels abroad are not covered but that foreign
cartels (or abuses) having effects in Switzerland are covered.
In this context, it is worth noting that potential conflicts of jurisdiction could arise with the European
Community4.  The EEA treaty contains specific provisions (art 57) to allocate jurisdictions in cases
of potential overlap, so that if Switzerland had signed the treaty, such conflicts would have been
avoided.  Even though it does not seem that significant conflicts have arisen so far,  the
implementation of the recent revision of the law (Oct. 1995) may change matters to the extent that
mergers are now subject to a notification procedure (as in the Community).  For instance,  the
acquisition of Source Perrier by Nestlé in 1992 would have been covered by both jurisdictions.
Similarly, the merger of  the rolling stock operations of ABB and Daimler Benz  and the
concentrative joint venture between Swissair and Sabena last year would also have  led to an
overlap (see EC, 1995).   The recently announced merger between Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy will be
reviewed by a number of jurisdictions including the EC and  possibly the US and Switzerland5.
1.1.2. Authorisation and Prohibition
The regime applicable to agreements and abuse of dominant positions in the EC is one of prohibition,
with exceptions in the case of agreements (art 85 § 3) but not for abuse of dominant positions.  By
                                                                
3  It is not clear however  how the principle of extra-territoriality can be applied in practice without explicit
coordination between anti-trust authorities across countries. In the case of the Community, the 1972 free trade
agreement with Switzerland contains a provision such that agreements between undertakings taking place in the
Community but having effects in Switzerland (and vice-versa) are not compatible with the functioning of the
agreement. This can form the legal basis for an action in the Community and the provision has been used recently
by the Cartel Commission against car manufacturers which prevent parallel imports in Switzerland from the
Community.
4 Given the extra-territorial application of US law, a conflict could also arise with the US but such instances are
however likely to be much less frequent.
5  The merger meets the criteria for review laid down in the Swiss law but it is unclear whether the merger law will
be enforced in time.  If the target date of July 1st is maintained, the merger may well escape from the scrutiny of
Swiss authorities. The merging firms have announced their intention to complete the merger by the end of June !8
contrast, the original (1962) Swiss statute was one of authorisation with a list of illegal practices -
which themselves could be justified on certain grounds. One of the essential characteristics of the
second (95) revision has been to considerably strengthen the presumption that (certain types of)
cartels are illegal, so that the new (95) law comes very close to a situation of prohibition6.
One should not overemphasise the difference between prohibition and authorisation regimes. Much
depends on the definition of agreements (or abuses) that are covered by a prohibition in comparison
with the specification of agreements (or abuses) that are listed as illegal in an authorisation regime.
The EC case law has indeed confirmed that some agreements are simply not covered by the
prohibition of  85 § 1 (see Bellamy and Child, 1993), in the same way that many agreements are not
listed as illegal by the Swiss statutes.  Interestingly, the burden of proof does not seem to be
markedly affected by the choice of a particular regime ; in the case of the Community, art 190 of the
Rome Treaty clearly puts the burden of proof on the EC Commission, which must produce
« sufficiently precise and coherent proof »  to support its allegations of infringement.   In the case of
Switzerland,  there is no explicit allocation of the burden of proof in the law, but in line with the
general principle of an authorisation framework,  it would seem from to the case law  that the Cartel
Commission has to motivate its decisions of infringement7.
It should be stressed however that the legal status of agreements between firms is affected by the
type of regime.  Under a regime of prohibition,  an agreement could be challenged by a contracting
party as legally void, until it has been explicitly declared lawful under the competition statute.  This
gives a strong incentive for parties to an  agreement to notify and obtain clearance.   In an
authorisation regime, the incentive to notify is much weaker to the extent that the list of illegal
practices (which could be challenged as legally void) is likely to be both narrower and more clearly
specified.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The Federal Coucil can still decide to bring forward the date at which the law comes into force.   This is a good
test of its resolve to an effective implementation of the new law.
6  As indicated above, a regime of prohibition for cartels, which involve per see prohibition of some contracts
would be difficult given that the Swiss constitution grants widespread freedom of contracting  (see Tercier, 1993).
7 The allocation of the burden of proof however mattered less in Switzerland to the extent that the scope for
judicial review was  much more limited, at least until the recent revision of the law.9
Given the lack of  a distinct treatment for agreements and abuse in the original Swiss law, there was
until 1995 a  potentially significant difference between the EC and Swiss practice : whereas abuses of
dominant positions could not be justified under EC law by countervailing benefits (there is no 86 § 3
article),  such abuses, being assimilated with agreements, could be justified under the Swiss law.
Under the second revision (95), different regimes have been introduced for agreements and abuses
of dominant positions (as indicated above) and the regime applicable to abuse of dominant position is
for all practical purposes one of prohibition.   Importantly,  there are no specific countervailing
benefits that can be considered to justify these practices and in this respect the Swiss law has again
moved closer to the EC statute.  However, as discussed below, decisions on agreements, abuses
and mergers can still be overturned by the executive (on the basis of public interest) under Swiss law
so that the convergence between the regime of the two statutes should not  be exaggerated.   In this
regard, the Swiss situation is closer to that found in  Germany.
1.1.3.  From cartels to agreements
The original (62) statute and its first (85) revision considered agreements8 which reduce competition
including regulation of production, sales, purchases prices and other conditions.  The law also
specified that resale price maintenance should be considered as a cartel agreement but only if it is
implemented by a cartel9.
In the original (1962) statute (and its first revision, with respect to civil law and procedures), such
agreements were presumed illegal when they aimed at preventing third parties from competing or
impeding them in the exercise of competition.
This formulation is remarkable in at least three respects ; first, it is clear that the law aimed at the
protection of competitors and not consumers or competition per se.  This is confirmed by the
(non  exhaustive) list of  unlawful practices that is provided by the law.  This approach stands in
contrast with the EC law enacted at about the same time which clearly aims (among other objectives)
                                                                
8 The (85) revision considers  « recommandation » as an alternative form of agreement in addition to conventions
and decisions which were specified in the original law.
9 This definition is somewhat circular but the intention of the law is clear enough  - namely to consider resale
price maintenance only in the presence of  other clauses which can restrict competition.10
at protecting competition. The fundamental concept underlying the Swiss law at the time was
potential competition.  The emphasis was on protecting potential competitors and the need to
prevent incumbents from erecting entry barriers. Interestingly, the theoretical underpinnings for a
competition law which places such heavy emphasis on potential competition, the theory of
« contestable markets », was not developed until the seventies.
Second, the laws avoided the protection of existing competitors and accordingly avoided getting
explicitly involved in issues of “ fair competition ” like the evaluation of contracts between strong and
weak parties.  It rightly focused on the effects that agreement could have on third parties, which is
the only anti-trust10 aspect involved in the evaluation of agreements.  Accordingly,  the fact that the
statutes protected competitors rather than competition may not have mattered much (by comparison
with other statutes like that of Germany act  which lean toward evaluations of fairness)  because they
focused on third parties.
Third,  the law required that members of a cartel should have the intention of restricting competition.
This requirement, which is absent from the EC law but has been much discussed in the US practice,
is potentially  damaging to the extent that cartels arising from tacit co-ordination of behaviour in a
repeated interaction are potentially excluded.    This provision was however dropped in the first
revision (85) of the law which focuses on the effect of the restriction to competition.
The main new element introduced by the first (85) revision of the law was a different approach for
the evaluation of agreements with respect to administrative law. The law explicitly stated (art 29 §
3) that cartels which impede effective competition were presumed to be illegal.  In addition, the law
indicated (art 29 § 2) that if  significant restrictions to competition are observed,  the Cartel
Commission should evaluate the positive and negative consequences of cartels, taking into account
the effect of the cartel on the extent of competition (« ampleur de la concurrence » )11.
The second (95) revision of the law has introduced important changes.  First, explicit references to
cartels have been avoided and the law now focuses on agreements.  Second, explicit reference to
                                                                
10 In what follows, we adopt the contemporary US practice and use the term anti-trust as an adjective meaning
« raising concerns of market power ».11
resale price maintenance in the scope of the law has been omitted but it is made clear that vertical
agreements (of different types) are included. Third and most importantly, the presumption under civil
law that only some types of agreements which affect potential competitors are unlawful has been
abandoned.  A  much more general presumption that agreements which affect competition in a
significant ("notable") way are unlawful is introduced for both civil and administrative procedures.
Fourth, the law further specifies a list of  agreements (those that suppress effective competition)
which are simply (per se) unlawful (i.e.  cannot be justified by the presence of countervailing
benefits12 - for both civil and administrative actions). The (apparently exhaustive) list of such
agreements (art. 5) comprises agreements to fix prices, restrict quantities and allocate geographical
markets.   These practices correspond by and large to those that can be considered as "per se"
illegal under EC law (i.e. those for which the provision of 85 § 3  are not effectively applicable
according to the case law).
Overall, the Swiss approach to the definition of unlawful agreements has moved significantly closer to
the EC practice (but not the letter of the law).  It  now focuses on competition (rather than
competitors) and includes some (quasi)  per se prohibitions.
1.1.4. Abuse of dominant positions
As indicated above, under the original statute and its first (85) revision, abuses of dominant positions
were only covered to the extent that firms with a dominant position13 were assimilated with cartels.
The discussion above on the definition of illegal practices for cartels therefore applies to abuses of
dominant position.  In particular, under civil law, only attempts to restrict entry could be presumed to
be unlawful.
The second (95) revision of the law has introduced a specific treatment for abuses (art 7).  There is a
presumption that the behaviour of dominant firms can be seen an abuse, and hence unlawful, when it
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
11 See section 1.1.6 for a detailed discussion of  this evaluation.
12 These practices can still be allowed by the executive on the basis of public interest (discussion below in
section 1.1.6.).
13The first revision of the law is explicit about the factors that should be taken into account to evaluate
dominance (art 4 § 2).  The list of factors provided is certainly sensible but lacks some organising principle.12
raises entry barriers or puts commercial partners at a disadvantage. The law also provides a (non
exhaustive) list of  such practices, which tracks the list provided by art 86 of  the Rome treaty, and
adds the refusal to sell and predatory pricing.   Given that these two practices have been considered
in EC case law (see for instance respectively the decisions on Polaroid/SSI Europe and Tetra Pak
II) as unlawful, the set of  practices that are in principle considered unlawful by Swiss and EC law
are very similar.
The wording of the presumption in art 7 is still remarkable.  Unlike the EC law which is very open on
the conditions under which an abuse can be found, the Swiss law indicates that an abuse is
associated with preventing entry or putting commercial partners at a disadvantage.  If the emphasis
on entry is commendable, one can wonder about the second reason for abuse (“ putting commercial
partners at a disadvantage ”). This wording may well lead the administrative authorities and the court
to enter into issues of fairness in contracts.  As indicated above, one of the achievements of the
Swiss statutes so far was that it had, at least formally, avoided this pitfall (see section 2.4. for an
analysis of the case law on this matter).
1.1.5. Mergers
Like the EC merger regulation, the second (95) revision of the law has introduced a notification
procedure for mergers (art 9).  Two conditions have to fulfilled, namely (i) that the joint turnover of
the enterprises involved in the concentration exceeds 2 billion francs world-wide or 500 million
francs in Switzerland and  (ii) at least two of the enterprises involved in the concentration have each
had a turnover of 100 million francs in Switzerland.
By comparison, according to the EC merger regulation, a concentration has a Community dimension
(and hence is covered by the statute) if  (i) the world-wide turnover of all parties is in excess of  7.5
billion Swiss francs14, (ii) the EC wide turnover of a least two parties is in excess of 375 million
Swiss francs each and (iii) at least one of the parties does  not achieve two third of its EC wide
turnover in one and the same member state.13
Quite appropriately given the size of the country relative to the Community, the Swiss statute will
cover smaller concentrations.  Yet, the lower limit on turnover for two partners in the concentration
which is set at 100 million Sfr each seems relatively high by comparison with the Community limit at
375 million Sfr. However, the German law covers only concentrations where the joint turnover
exceeds 400 million Sfr (or where the employment level of the companies concerned exceeds 10
000). Note however that the German law also has a market share criterion (20%) which is entirely
absent in the Switzerland.
Importantly, the Swiss law has avoided making reference, like the EC merger regulation, to a relative
criterion for the concentration of activities (namely the rule that at least one of the undertaking does
not achieve two-third of its EC wide turnover in one and the same member state).  Such a criterion
introduces a bias in the scope of  the review such that for a given increase in concentration in some
national market,  mergers between firms that are concentrated on their domestic markets might be
excluded whereas mergers between geographically diversified entities will be reviewed (see Neven et
al, 1993).
A concentration can be forbidden (or authorised with remedies) if it would create or reinforce a
dominant position which could suppress effective competition and when there is no countervailing
benefit in terms of  improving competition in other markets.    Two remarks are in order ; first,
whereas the EC statute considers “ significant impediments ” to effective competition, the Swiss
law insists on effective competition being « suppressed »   From this perspective, the Swiss statute
could be seen as more permissive15.    Second,  the statute does not allow for countervailing
benefits (outside competition benefits) to be taken into account in the evaluation of the concentration.
In this respect, the Swiss law closely follows the spirit of the German law.  It is also close to the EC
law which does not seem to allow for efficiency defences either (at least formally)  and does not even
consider countervailing benefits in terms of competition.  Here again, it seems that the Swiss law
could be marginally more permissive than the EC.
1.1.6. The exceptions
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
14 In what follows, we use an exchange rate of 1.5 between the Ecus an the Swiss franc.14
As indicated above, the Swiss statutes have allowed for various countervailing benefits to be taken
into account which may overturn the presumption that some practice is unlawful.   The approach
followed by the statutes has also changed markedly over time but has followed the same structure:
practices that are presumed unlawful can be justified by countervailing benefits but some cannot.
There is therefore a threshold beyond which restrictive practice should be seen as beyond
redemption. What has changed over time is the type of justifications that can be taken into account
and the definition of those practices (a subset of those presumed illegal) which cannot  be justified.
(i) The original statute
In the original (62) statute, practices that were presumed unlawful could still be justified by dominant
legitimate interests as long as they did not restrict competition in excess of what is necessary to
achieve their aim. The law also provided examples of legitimate dominant interests, including the
preservation of loyal competition, establishing reasonable technical specifications at the industry level,
the promotion of an industrial structure in the public interest, the implementation of a cartel abroad
and the implementation of reasonable regulated prices (which maintain quality and services).    This
list is truly astonishing in its generality (e.g. by comparison with the provision of art 85 §3 of the
Rome Treaty) and could certainly be abused.   As suggested above,  the law also stipulated however
that measures which aim solely at barring entry could not be justified by legitimate interests.   This
provision confirms the importance of potential competition in the original statute.
(ii) The 1985 statute
The first (85) revision of the statute confirmed this approach with respect civil law and procedures.
It merely clarified that private dominant interest could be taken into accounts as long as they did not
conflict with the public interest. The (non exhaustive) list of admissible interests however remained
unchanged.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
15  This evaluation is reinforced by the observation that the general exemption on the basis of the public interest
also applies to mergers (as well as to agreements and abuses - see below for a discussion of this provision).15
The main innovations in the first (85) revision concerned the provisions of administrative law. For
cases where significant restrictions of competition are observed,  it provided the Cartel Commission
with clearer guidelines (art. 29) about the positive and negative, social and economic consequences it
had to consider.   It emphasised that it should explicitly study the effects on the extent of competition.
And it stressed that when effective competition was impeded, there is a presumption that negative
consequences will dominate. This presumption could be overturned only by dominating public
interest.
A number of remarks are in order.
- First, it is striking that the provisions of civil and administrative sections of the 1985 law differed so
much.  Surely, this does not contribute to transparency and legal certainty.
- Second,  the evaluation task assigned to the Commission is very general.   The inclusion of social
consequences certainly leaves a lot of room for manoeuvre in justifying some practices, and imposes
a very strong workload on the Cartel Commission.  Indeed, the mere idea of  undertaking a rigorous
market study in which  one takes into account the whole spectrum of effects from labour interests to
regional economics is somewhat daunting.
- Third, the statute introduced a complicated system of  justification: at the first level, the Commission
had to decide whether significant restrictions to competition were observed.  If so, it had to decide
whether effective competition was impeded (see figure 1).  If not, a balance of  social and economic
consequences had to be considered.  If indeed effective competition was suppressed,  another type
of justification had to be considered, namely the public interest.
What is striking in this  system is that the justifications which could be used, depending on whether
effective competition was impeded or not,  are equally general (if anything the public interest is
marginally more general that all social and economic consequences). One can more readily
appreciate the use of a multiple evaluation system when more general considerations can be taken
into account for more serious offences.   Similarly, hierarchical reviews (as in the the UK) involving16
wider criteria at a higher level could be justified.   It is unclear however whether a multiple evaluation
system with equally general criteria for all offences is at all useful.
- Fourth, the statute introduced a new concept, namely that of effective competition being impeded.
This is a rather vague concept, which leaves a lot of discretion to the Commission.  The effectiveness
of the statute could thus be expected to depend very much on the quality and consistency of the
analysis undertaken by the Commission.
(iii) The current law
The second revision of the law has maintained the idea of a multiple evaluation and has extended the
procedure to civil law but the process of evaluation has changed in two fundamental ways (see figure
2).  First, for those agreements that do not suppress effective16 competition,  the Commission of
Competition is no longer  required to do a balancing of economic and social costs and benefits to
reach its conclusions. Rather it  should limit itself to studying the impact the cartel has on economic
efficiency and the law gives an apparently exhaustive list of these motives (reduction of distribution
and production costs, improved quality, promotion of research and the diffusion of knowledge and a
more rational exploitation of  resources).   Second, a hierarchy is introduced in the evaluation: both
the agreements that suppress effective competition and those that do not but cannot be justified by
countervailing economic benefits can be reviewed by the federal council.  The decision of the
competition commission can then be overturned on the basis of a wider criteria, namely the public
interest.  It is, however, clear that the legislator anticipates this step to be taken only in exceptional
circumstances.
Note that the revision has addressed two of the shortcomings of the 1985 law mentioned above
(inconsistency between civil and administrative procedure - equally general criteria of evaluation at
the two levels).    A priori, its seems that the law has become more restrictive as countervailing
benefits have been narrowed to more strictly economic considerations  . The list of motives that can
be appealed to now closely tracks that of art 85 &3 of the Rome Treaty.    Unlike the Treaty,
however, no reference is made to the proportion of the efficiency benefits that should be passed on17
to consumers and one may regret that the recent revision of  the law has missed an opportunity to
state that consumer welfare is a central consideration in the implementation of competition policy.
Still, the law has become somewhat more stringent not only because the list of criteria is smaller but
also because its  implementation should gain both in transparency and consistency.  Indeed, the
balance between social and economic consequences is potentially a somewhat arbitrary exercise,
which could be particularly vulnerable to capture.  Narrower economic criteria are less prone to
manipulation.   In addition (as indicated above), the law has become considerably more stringent
about the type of agreements that are presumed to suppress effective competition and accordingly
cannot be justified by economic countervailing benefits (namely agreements to fix prices or quantities
and share markets)17.
Overall, the workload of the cartel authority has been considerably alleviated. The  Swiss cartel law
essentially follows the example of the German GWB in adopting a separation between efficiency
considerations which are the competence of the BKA and more general considerations which are
taken into account by the Minister.
As indicated above, abuses of dominant positions cannot be justified by efficiency considerations.
A decision of infringement by the Commission in this matter can still be overturned by the executive
on the basis of public interest.
For mergers, the situation is also different.  Concentrations that could suppress effective competition
are unlawful unless there are some benefits in terms of competition.   Accordingly, both the
presumption and the criteria that can be used to justify a concentration differ from the presumption
and the criteria that can be used to justify an agreement at the first level of evaluation by the
Commission. As in the case of agreements and abuses of dominance, a review by the Federal
Council is still possible  on the basis of the general interest.   As indicated above, this approach is
close to that used in Germany and the Community but is potentially more lenient than the latter.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
16 Note that « impede » (empêcher) has been replaced by « suppress » (supprimer).
17 There is one respect in which the law may have become weaker : as suggested above, the presumption of
illegality is now formulated in terms of effective competition being suppressed rather than impeded.  It is not clear
whether the distinction matters - indeed the members of the secretariat were not aware of the change of in
formulation !  The distinction between « empêcher » and  « supprimer » in french is also not as strong as that
between « impede » and « suppress ».18
1.1.7. Conclusion
A number of conclusions emerge from this comparative analysis.
(i) The treatment of agreements under Swiss law has moved as close as possible to EC while
retaining an authorisation framework (which is dictated by the Swiss constitution).
(ii) A significant achievement of the Swiss law has been to avoid explicitly covering issues of fairness
in contracts.  The recent revision of the law with respect to abuse of dominant positions could
unfortunately be interpreted as leaning in that direction.
(iii) The treatment of abuses of dominant position has now moved closer to the EC practice to the
extent that countervailing benefits can no longer be taken into account in their evaluation.
(iv) The treatment of mergers is a mixture between EC and German practices.  Both the criteria for
review of a concentration and those for their evaluation suggest that the treatment of mergers will be
significantly more lenient than in Germany and the Community.
(v) The recent revision of the law has considerably narrowed down the set of countervailing benefits
that the Commission can take into account and focused on economic criteria that are less prone to
manipulation.   From this prospective, the law has become more restrictive and the task  of the
Cartel Authority has been considerably simplified.
(vi)  Like Germany and the UK, but unlike the Community,  Switzerland has multiple levels of
evaluation.  The recent revision of the law has clarified matters a great deal by specifying  different
criteria  for each level of evaluation (namely specific economic consequences and the public interest).
(vii)  The recent revision of the statute has harmonised potentially damaging differences between civil
and administrative law and procedures.
(viii)  The concept of effective competition has become central in the statute.  It is however a rather
vague concept  which leaves a lot of discretion to the commission.   The effectiveness of the law will
depend a great deal on the content that the Commission attaches to this concept (see also von
Ungern-Sternberg, 1993, on this issue).
1.2 Procedures and institutions
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Our main concern in analysing institutions is to evaluate whether the policy can be implemented
effectively, i.e. whether the courts, the civil servants and the executive of the commission will defend
the interests that they are supposed to serve according to the law.  The independence of the
institutions, namely their ability to resist pressure from particular interest groups is of course an
important dimension to be considered in the analysis, as it should contribute to the effectiveness of
policy implementation.   The factors that shape the independence of  an institution will also vary from
one particular body to the other; for instance the independence of civil servants will presumably be
much affected by their evaluation and promotion system.   Relevant aspects will include the following
: can the executive sanction an evaluation which does not support its own view ?  is the practice of
the revolving door common - such that civil servants can shift employment to the private sector and
vice versa - ?  Regarding the independence of the executive of  the Commission one might include
elements such as careers prospects but also the terms of his/her contract (who nominates him/her,
what is the length of the contract ?  how can he/she be dismissed ? is he/she allowed to have formal
links with companies or professional associations ? ).
Independence should not however be considered the sole answer to the effectiveness of the policy.
Indeed, completely independent agents could take arbitrary or dogmatic decisions and appropriate
the policy to their own benefits.   Independence should be balanced by appropriate measures to
ensure the accountability of the institutions entrusted with the implementation of the policy. The
accountability of an institution will be determined by a variety of factors including the precision of the
brief that is given by the law,  the reporting requirements imposed on the institution, the verifiability of
its achievement and the procedures for appealing its decisions.  From this prospective, the
assignment of precise rules to an institution is preferable to wide discretion.   Precise rules can
however not be designed for all contingencies so that a fair amount of discretion may be necessary to
ensure a flexible implementation of the law, which can be tailored to the specifics of the case at hand.
Discretion may be particular valuable in the implementation of competition policy (for instance,
relative to the management of the central bank money supply), so that the trade off between the
flexibility of the policy and the accountability of the institution implementing it, is particularly delicate
for competition policy (see Neven et al., 1993, for a detailed discussion of these issues).20
In principle, both the  independence and the accountability of an institution can be enhanced by
greater transparency;  transparency ensures that institutions take full responsibility in view of the
public for the decisions they take.  For instance,  the independence of  the Competition Commission
will be enhanced if its recommendations to the executive are made public, since the executive will
have to bear full responsibility if it overturns a recommendation.  But publication of the
recommendations  will also enhance the accountability of the commission.
Of course, the independence, accountability and transparency of a policy are not determined solely
by the details of the statutes analysed in this section.  For instance, the independence of the OFT in
the UK is associated with the high standing and reputation of its civil service - a dimension which can
at best be partially traced back to the details of the statute. As indicated by the previous discussion,
many contractual arrangements which are not determined by the law will also matter.
1.2.1  The original procedure
The original statute (1962) emphasised the civil implementation of the law, so that much of the power
to implement the law rested with the courts (at the canton level and at the federal level on appeal).
The original statute (1962) created the Cartel Commission, but gave it only very little power.  It was
supposed to undertake general studies of particular markets, either on its own initiative or at the
request of the minister of economics. In addition, the minister could ask the commission to undertake
"special" studies to examine if indeed cartels (or analogous organisations) were against the public
interest.
The law specified that the Commission was made up of members (nominated by the federal council)
coming from economics, and law as well as representatives from business and consumer
organisations. In practice, this provision went a long way towards insuring a wide representation of
interest groups in the council, possibly at the expense of expertise : both the COOP and the
MIGROS (two large distributors- which account for about 70 % of the Swiss food retail market),
the Association of  Farmers, the Association of Employers, the Trade Unions, the Association of
Small Businesses and the Consumer organisation have had a representative in the Commission.21
Arguably, it is only the Consumer organisation that has a clear interest in fostering competition and
this composition is highly unsusual.   Funnily enough,  the statute indicates that the member of the
Council are independent  but apparently what is meant here (according to private communication
with the Secretariat) is that the members are not part of the civil service.
Even though the allocation of seats between interest groups is not statutory, is has never been
changed.  Members were nominated for a period of 4 years and could only be removed by the
Federal Council for serious offences.   It is not clear from the statute what the status of the secretariat
was at the time.  The law also gave the Commission the obligation and right to publish an annual
report.
Overall,  one cannot help noticing that the composition of the Commission was  not made of
independent experts and one can wonder whether this arrangement, which has been maintained until
now,  offered adequate guarantees in terms of independence.  On the one hand, one could argue that
a clear representation of interest in the Commission actually reduces the scope for capture by
particular interests ; members of the Commission might fear losing credibility with their colleagues by
defending the interest of their organisation too vocally and hence will be reluctant to do so. On the
other hand, one could argue that all members of the commission have  a strong incentive to reach a
gentleman’s agreement such that the interest of the parties their represent are not seriously
encroached upon.   The repeated nature of their interaction might also help them in sustaining this
« collusive outcome » of no warfare.     Which outcome will prevail might, in those circumstances,
might depend very much on the profile of the President.  Without putting forward a judgement ex
post on this outcome, it seems unwise to leave the independence of a Commission too exposed to
particular group dynamics or the personality of its president.
A further important weakness of the old cartel law was that the Commission could take very little
action on the basis of its studies. It was limited to making suggestions  to the cartel to change or
abolish some of its clauses.
Finally, the Commission did not even have the right to publish the results of the studies.  In the case
of general studies, the presumption was that studies would be published but the minister could decide22
otherwise.  In the case of special studies, the minister simply decided ; in those circumstances where
indeed it was more likely that serious competition issues were at stake, the cost of cover up for the
minister was thus lowered (it is indeed more costly to prevent publication when the general public
expects it).
The Minister could decide, on the basis of a special study, to take action in front the federal court
against a cartel (or analogous organisation).  However, between 1962 and the first revision of the
law (1985), only seven special studies were undertaken and none of them was followed by an action
in front of the federal court.   Only a subset of them were published.
Overall, the original arrangements are characterised by a weak Cartel Commission and a procedure
which lacks transparency.
1.2.2. The first revision
The first (85) revision of the law introduced many changes to the administrative procedure. First,
while it did not change the composition of the Commission (which accordingly might have remained
quite dependent on its composition and on the personality of its president - as argued above), it did
go a first step in the direction of increasing its independence, by specifying that  members should
withdraw from the commission if they were associated with a particular party in the case at hand.
Interestingly however, it is explicitly mentioned that representing a professional association to which
one of the parties at hand belongs is not considered a reason for withdrawal !
The organisation of the secretariat is further specified in the law, which stipulates that the council of
minister decides on its status and administrative level.    Still, the members of the secretariat were
answerable both to the Minister and to the Commission and personnel decisions (in particular, firing
and promotions) were not delegated completely to the Commission (which would have guaranteed
greater independence).
One of the main modifications of the 85 revision was to increase the power of the Commission: As
before it could make recommendations to the cartel, but now the parties had to declare in writing23
whether they accepted these recommendations. If they did so,  the matter was closed and indeed, it
(theoretically) might never come to the attention of the public at all as the Commission has no
automatic right to publish its analysis and recommendations. (As before the minister decides whether
or not to publish, but he never made use of his right to prevent publication).    If the parties did not
accept the recommendations of the Commission, the minister could take a formal decision, upon the
proposition of the Commission.   Firms could appeal this decision only in front of the Federal Court
for points of law and procedure.
Importantly, in this arrangement, the recommendations of the Commission cannot be appealed to
court (because they are not legal decisions).  It is only the decision of the Minister of economics that
can be challenged and such legal actions are rare.   Being fairly immune from the threat of judicial
review, the Commission therefore enjoyed a great deal of independence.  Its only constraint was the
acceptance of the recommendation by the Minister of economics.
In theory,  this might have given a strong incentive to the Commission to negotiate with the parties.
Indeed, if the Commission expects that the minister might not follow its recommendations (because
the minister represents wider - or narrower - interests) , it will avoid being disavowed by the Minister
by negotiating a deal with the parties involved.  Whether the parties involved or the Commission have
a strong hand in the negotiation thus depends very much on what the minister can be expected to do.
If the parties at hand  can rally the minister to their point of view, the Commission will be in a weak
position.  Of course, the fact that the minister bears relatively little cost when deciding not to follow
the recommendations of the Commission (since there is no compulsory  publication) might be
expected to reinforce the bargaining power of the firms.
The observation that all  recommendations have been accepted and published since 1985 is of
course hard to interpret. It might suggest that the Commission has been careful in presenting
recommendations that would be acceptable to the executive.  Alternatively, it may very well be that
the executive has decided, as a rule, to follow the recommendations of the Commission.  The  large
debate and wide criticisms that has surrounded the publication of some studies tend to support the
latter view.24
Overall, it may very well be that the Commission has had a strong hand in dealing with firms,
precisely because the Minister had committed himself  not to make use of its power to undermine the
Commission18. With little threat of judicial review and a determined political support it seems that the
Cartel Commission may have enjoyed an unusual degree of independence.    At the same time, given
the power of the Commission  and the generality of the law that it was applying, one can have
legitimate worries about its accountability.   It seems that institutional and legal circumstances were
favourable to an outcome where the Commission was going to « write new laws »  without effective
checks and balances.
Irrespective of the outcome,  one should still emphasise the vulnerability of the institutional
arrangement prevailing under the 85 law.  Indeed, the outcome seems highly dependent on the
personal characteristics of both the president of the Cartel Commission and the minister of
economics.
1.2.3. The current law
The second (95)  revision of the law has confirmed the increasing role that the commission is
supposed to play.  It has been renamed "competition commission" and its opinion is now required
even in the context of civil procedures.
The composition of the Commission has been modified.  The reference to representatives of
particular groups or professions has been dropped and the commission is supposed to count a
majority of independent19 experts.  Even though the new formulation could be abused at the margin,
it is a significant improvement over the previous provision.  Unfortunately, the conditions of
withdrawal for particular cases  have not been modified.   The wording of the nomination procedure
for the Commission has been changed: the council of ministers nominates the chairman and two vice-
chairman. It is thus not clear from the law who nominates  the other members of the Commission.
According to the Secretariat,  they will also be nominated by the Council of  ministers. It seems that
a procedure of co-optation by the chair (and vice-chair)  which could have contributed to greater
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independence of the Commission has been ruled out. (Co-option procedure are not of course
without their own risks.)
The most important innovation of the current law concerns the formal authority of the Commission.
The Commission can now issue decisions which are directly binding for the parties at hand.  The
Federal Council can still overturn the decision upon request from the parties involved on the basis of
the public interest.  The law makes it clear however that an authorisation by the council is expected
to be rare, has to be limited in duration and that it can involve remedies of its own.  This new
procedure offers much stronger guarantees of independence than the previous law in several
respects: first, it is more costly for the executive to overturn a decision than not to follow a
recommendation.  Accordingly, the incentive to negotiate and to accommodate the parties ex ante is
much reduced.  Second, it is now the responsibility of the whole executive and not a single minister
to rule against the Commission.  This matters because presumably, it is much more difficult for parties
at hand to convince the whole council than a single individual (who is by tradition attached to right
wing parties and hence is more likely to favour the interests of the firms).  Finally, it is clear from  the
law that the exemption by the Federal council is not expected to be norm, and this increases the cost
of implementing it.
The scope for judicial appeal has also been modified (see figure 2).  There are now two levels of
judicial appeal.  One in front of the « appeal commission », which despite its name,  is a judicial
body ruling on both law and procedure.  A second appeal can also be lodged in front of the Federal
Court (again both on points of law and procedure).  Importantly, since the Commission will now
take  « decisions »,  a direct challenge against the ruling of the Commission can be lodged.  This new
arrangement greatly enhances the accountability of the Commission.
Importantly, the Commission now has the right and duty to announce publicly that an enquiry is
initiated.  This reduces the risk that some agreement is reached without the public knowing that a
negotiation ever took place and accordingly enhances the transparency and accountability of the
procedure. The Commission also has the right under the new law to decide on the publications of its
decisions. This is an improvement over the previous procedure, where the minister could block the
publication.  One may regret however that the Commission does not have an obligation to publish.26
For the sake of transparency, it is important that the Commission should publish its reasoning in full ;
this would ensure that the Commission is indeed accountable (the quality of its analysis can be
scrutinised by the public) and it would further gain in independence (if the federal council overturns
the argument, it would have to argue its case).  One can also regret that the law does not require the
federal council to motivate its decision.  Indeed, the council would be less prone to capture if the
particular influences motivating its decision  could be more easily exposed.
Finally, the organisation and status of the secretariat has been changed.   The members of the
secretariat are answerable solely to its director and the Commission.   Decisions on dismissals and
promotion are normally taken by the director, in agreement with the Commission.   The power of the
Minister in this matter has been greatly reduced20 and is now limited to disciplinary actions against
some public offences. Importantly, the Secretariat is now formally responsible for undertaking the
studies.   It will organise the hearings, collect the evidence and undertake the analysis without direct
interference from the Commission.
Overall, the new law offers significantly better guarantees of independence from outside pressure
than the previous one.  It has also greatly enhanced the accountability of the Commission.
1.3.  Some organising principles for the analysis of the case law
Our discussion of the statute suggest a number of issues that should be kept in mind in evaluating the
case law.
(i) The concept of effective competition is central both in the first (85) and second (95) revision of
the law.   Whether effective competition is impeded (or suppressed in the second revision) will
determine whether countervailing benefits can be taken into account.   Yet, the concept  is somewhat
vague and it is important to evaluate how it has been applied.
(ii) In the context of the first revision, the Cartel Commission was supposed to evaluate
countervailing benefits and weight them against negative effects on competition.  This evaluation is27
critical and it will remain important for the current law.   One should carefully scrutinise how the
Commission has implemented this procedure.
(iii)  Given the wide discretion given to the Cartel Commission, regarding both the definition of
effective competition and the evaluation of countervailing benefits,  its wide power and the weak
threat of judicial and political challenge to which it is exposed, we formulated the hypothesis that the
Commission was indeed  weakly accountable, could potentially follow its own agenda but also that
its composition may not offer appropriate guarantee of independence from interest groups.
Particular attention to this hypothesis should be given, as the analysis of the cases may reveal confirm
both the lack of accountability  and the influence of interest groups.
(iv) The law has managed to avoid explicit reference to issues of fairness. One should however
check that the case law has not confused them with anti-trust issues.
(v)  As always the quality of decisions will depend on the analysis of the market.  Accordingly, we
will give particular attention to the market definition adopted by the Commission and to its analysis of
dominance.
2. The Case law
Effective competition is a central concept for the implementation of competition policy in Switzerland.
The concept is used as a threshold with determines in part the type of analysis which is performed.
However,  the evaluation of this threshold will itself be dependent on the analysis of the market and
hinges in particular on the definition of the relevant market and on the analysis of dominance.
Accordingly, we start by reviewing the analysis of markets and subsequently discuss effective
competition, the evaluation of countervailing benefits and  remedies.   The objective of this section is
not to provide a complete review of the cases but rather to illustrate through cases some important
characteristics of the approach revealed by the case law.    Similarly, the discussion of the cases and
reports that follows is not meant to evaluate whether decisions were « right » or « wrong ».  The
information available from the report is often not sufficient to express such a judgement with
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confidence.   All we aim at, is to comment on the analysis which is presented in the report without
judging the final outcome.
In what follows, we focus on the case law since the implementation of the first revision (85).  Indeed,
as argued above, the previous decisions were taken under a rather different law and accordingly are
much less likely to be informative about the functioning of the current law.    In addition, we will focus
on decisions taken under the administrative  procedure.  The reason is twofold.  First administrative
decisions form the majority of cases.  Second, the law which currently applies for both administrative
and civil law is closest to the administrative procedure implemented since 1985.    Accordingly, civil
decisions may not be as informative as administrative decisions for the evaluation of the current
statute.
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that the case reports published by the Commission are highly
unusual by comparison with those of other jurisdictions.   This emphasis on « market studies » found
in the orignal law has left traces until the recent practice of the Commission ; most cases include very
long descriptions of the industry and the opinions of interested parties are often reported in great
detail.  Many of the facts and opinions that are reported have only debatable connections with the
case at hand.  More importantly,  many case reports restrict themselves to a collection of opinions
and judgmental statements by the Commission.   The   analysis is, in the best cases,  short and often
altogether missing.  This feature, which will be illustrated by some case discussion later, can be seen
a serious symptom of weak accountability.    Indeed, if the Commission had been under serious
threat of judicial of political challenge, it would presumably would have felt compelled to develop its
analysis further.
2.1 The analysis of markets
In order to evaluate the anti-competitive effects of an agreement or merger, it is useful to define at the
outset a market in which some market power could be exercised.  Accordingly, most anti-trust
analysts tend to start by defining the «  relevant market ». Methods vary a great deal across
jurisdictions, from the systematic 5% rule in the US to the more informal approach of the EC
Commission (see Fischwick and Denison, 1992 for details),  but the general approach is similar.29
The authorities start with a narrow market (both in terms of product and geographical scope), ask
whether market power (by a hypothetical monopolist) could be exercised in that market and
consider wider and wider markets until one is found in which market power could indeed be
exercised.   In evaluating whether market power could be exercised in any particular market, the
following elements are considered : demand substitution (to what extent will consumers switch to
other firms if price is raised), supply substitution by existing competitors (to what extent will other
firms outside the candidate market react to a change in price by the monopolist) and supply
substitution by new products (to what extent will existing firms change their product offering as a
consequence of the change in price by the monopolist).   Here again, the emphasis given respectively
to demand and supply substitution might vary across jurisdictions (with for instance, the EC
emphasising demand substitution) but the basic approach is the same.
In the Cartel Commission reports, it seems in many cases that a proper analysis of the relevant
market is simply omitted.   For instance, in the analysis of the banking cartel, it is stated that21  (p
178) « the market to take into account is determined on a case by case basis according to the scope
of the agreement being considered ». Yet, in the analysis of each particular agreement nothing is said
about the relevant market.
In other cases, the definition of market is somewhat confusing.  A first important confusion seems to
arise in many cases with respect to the geographical market.  For instance, in the banking cartel, it is
stated that « the Swiss territory should be considered as the area covered by the report ». Similarly,
it is stated in the report on cars and spare part distribution that « the legal principle of territoriality
dictates that the Swiss market should be taken into account ».
It is not clear what legal principle the reports refer to.  Such a principle is certainly not explicitly
stated in the law. In line with the approach followed by the statute, on can still understand this
principle as indicating that only effects felt in Switzerland should be taken into account.  Such an
approach is sensible and it  is followed by other jurisdictions (like the EC).   However, this approach
does not imply that the relevant market (from an anti-trust prospective) is the Swiss market.30
Indeed, it may very well be that demand and supply substitutions are such that a « monopolist » in
the Swiss market could not exercise market power, because of competition from abroad, so that the
relevant market is wider. Yet, it seems that the commission has systematically considered that
because of the legal principle of territoriality, the relevant (anti-trust) market was Switzerland.
There are some instances where the distinction may have mattered.  For instance, in the report on
banks, the Commission has failed to consider the possibility that in some segments, Swiss banks may
have been unable to exercise market power on the Swiss market because of international
competition. This is all the more surprising, since the Commission places heavy emphasis on the
internationalisation of the banking sector in the preamble to its report.   Most  of the report is written
as if  the relevant market could only be domestic.  This may be correct for some segments (e.g.
savings account for Swiss customers).    Yet, some banking services are clearly traded
internationally. Banking services are one of Switzerland’s most successful exports.  In its analysis on
Convention IV on « deposit fees for securities» the Cartel Commission writes:  « Given that the
majority of banks who offer and manage deposits have signed the convention and thus accepted a
uniform tariff, the extent of competition has been considerably reduced ».  International competition
is not even mentioned in this section of the report.
The market for placing government securities is a further case where a more detailed analysis of the
relevant market would have been warranted. In private communication, the Secretariat of the Cartel
Commission has acknowledged that the relevant market could have been wider, but insisted that on
the fact that the Swiss governement was only buying placement services from domestic banks.   It is
unclear whether there is a competition issue if a buyer decides,  for whatever reason,  to limit its
purchases to a small subset of (high price) suppliers. In our view,  this is an instance where the
Commission has used its wide power and discretion to implement a pro-active competition policy,
rather than applying competition law.
In the case of the Cement cartel, the Commission writes that the « geographical relevant market is
the whole area of Switzerland. Imports and the danger of imports (potential competition) should also
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be considered. An area of approximately 200 km around Switzerland as a possible source of cement
does not seem unrealistic in view of foreign cement and transport prices ». Nevertheless, the Cartel
Commission dismissed the evidence that prices within Switzerland tend to fall as one approaches the
borders (as a matter of fact, the Commission even refused to consider imports in its analysis of
dominance and went on to conclude that the cartel had impeded effective competition - see
discussion below).
In our view, a proper consideration of foreign competition is essential for the pursuit of competition
policy in a small open economy such as Switzerland, and a careful definition of the relevant market
can be of great help in properly directing the focus of the analysis.
The shortcomings of a non-systematic approach also manifest themselves with respect to product
markets.  In the report on the Swiss tennis magazine SMASH, the Commission has followed a more
traditional approach and emphasises the need to take into account the substitutability between
products.  But the analysis in the report has remained at the level of  general principles without
providing evidence in favour of the very narrow view taken by the Commission : indeed, the
Commission has concluded that the relevant market in this case was the «  Swiss market for
advertising space for tennis articles in specialised magazines ».   Such an unusual market definition22
could have been backed by a proper evidence, like a survey of market participants.  The secretariat
of the commission has told us in private communication that a quantitative analysis was undertaken.
The fact that this evidence was not reported is yet another symptom of weak accountability ;  if the
Commission had been working under a significant threat of judicial or political review, it would have
felt compelled to back up its decisions with adequate evidence.   In the event, some terse judgment
seemed to suffice.
Overall, one cannot help conclude that the issue of market definition is not given proper attention in
the Commission reports, at least by comparison with decisions published by other competition
authorities.  The information that is given in the reports is frequently insufficient to convince the reader
that a sensible market definition has been used in the analysis. The importance of a proper market
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definition as a tool which provides structure and  rigour to the analysis of  markets should not be
underestimated.  This is further illustrated by the report on banks, which did not bother to specify the
relevant market for retail banking services: as a result it simply omitted to mention the important role
played by the PTT in that market. If the Commission has properly defined the market, it could not
possibly have overlooked this large competitor.
2.2. Effective competition and the analysis of dominance
As indicated in the first section, the concept of effective competition is central to the implementation
of the law. The intention behind the law in putting forward such a concept is clear enough, namely to
determine a threshold for restrictions of competition which could be considered beyond redemption.
But the evaluation of effective competition was bound to be difficult in practice.
Some clues as to the meaning of effective competition can be obtained from the Message to the
parliament relating the adoption of the new law (23 Nov. 94). According to this «  guideline »,
effective competition should not be considered as equivalent to « workable » competition.  The
concept of workable competition, which was developed in the sixties as the «  acceptable
approximation to perfect competition » is presented as the origin of the effective competition but is
firmly rejected as such.  This is probably due to the fact, that the concept of workable competition
has never been given any precise content and it is hard to resist quoting Stigler on the matter: « To
determine whether an industry is workably competitive, therefore, simply have a good graduate
student write his dissertation on the industry and render a verdict.  It is crucial for this test, of course,
that no second graduate student be allowed to study the industry »  (Stigler, 1956).
According to the « guideline »,  effective competition should be considered  « in the context of
modern theories of industrial organisation, recognising that competition is multi-facet dynamic
process ».   The guideline further elaborates by stating that effective competition is guaranteed when
« the function of competition as a mechanism to allocate resources efficiently  is not impeded ».
From this, the guideline also concludes that competition policy, in ensuring effective competition,
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should not be diverted by other political considerations (which might presumably interfere with
competition as a mechanism to allocate resources efficiently).
It is hard to disagree with this statement.  Unfortunately, it  falls short of  providing more practical
insights for the implementation of the concept, namely the definition of  a threshold beyond which
restrictions of competition cannot be justified.  Unfortunately, the experience of other competition
authorities is not particularly helpful either.  For instance, the EC barely uses the concept of effective
competition.   The concept is used in the EC merger law but is not given prominence in the case law
(see Zachmann, 1994).
A common approach to the evaluation of effective competition can be found in a number of studies.
This approach considers three tests, namely a structural, a behavioural and a outcome test (see for
instance the report on banks).  The intention behind these three tests is clear enough, but somewhat
reminiscent of the « Harvard approach » which led to the,  much criticized, concept of « workable
competition ».
The behavioural test seems to focus on whether consumers can buy from firms that are not part of
the agreement under review.  For instance,  in the bank report ( p 179) the Commission emphasises
that customers (of retail banking services) can still buy from firms who are not part of the agreement.
Nevertheless, in the same report, the Commission also decided, that the Swiss Banking Cartel
impeded effective competition on the market for placing Swiss government debt, despite the fact that
the Government has the choice of placing debt with international banks (see discussion above). In the
cement case,  the report indicates that customers do not have the choice between members of the
cartel (which allocate production) and that imports are not a significant alternative source of supply.
In the car study, it is argued that garages do not have the choice between alternative car importers
(p291).   Concerning car importers (p276), the Commission has insisted that there is no intra-brand
competition (it is impossible for a prospective car importer to compete with established ones).
These cases illustrate that the Commission, through its behavioural test,  was indeed trying to  verify
whether customers had alternative sources of supply.  Interestingly, this evaluation has little to do
with the usual issues raised by firms’ behaviour.  One would have expected a behavioral test to focus34
on issues like collective dominance, coordination of behavior or pre-emption.  In the presence of
such behaviour, markets share are indeed a poor indicator of market power.
With respect to the structural test,  the Commission seems to emphasise entry.  For instance in the
cement case, the Commission has commented on the high barriers to entry and the potential for
retaliation by incumbents  against potential entrants (strategic entry barriers).  Similarly, in the case of
banks,  the Commission paid attention to entry barriers raised by the banking commission and
noticed the constant flow of entrants in the industry (p179).   Similar issues are raised for car
importers (p 280), but for distributors, the emphasis is given to the lack of incentive to enter
(because of excess capacity). In the case of spare parts, the Commission provides market share data
on the distribution by type of channels - which is somewhat odd given that the emphasis is on the
market for the provision of spare parts at the wholesale level- but also insists on the difficulty of
entry.    Overall, if the emphasis on entry in the structural test is commendable, it is striking that the
Commission does not consider market share or concentration indices.   Even if such indices can be
easily abused as indicator of the existence of market power, they tend to provide reliable information
on the absence of market power (a low market share is more informative than a high market share,
see for instance, EC, 1994).    The scepticism of the Commission towards market shares and
concentration,  which is revealed by their neglect of the issue, seems somewhat excessive, and
certainly out of line with the practice of other jurisdicitions.
Regarding outcomes, various considerations have been mentioned.  In the case of banks, the report
notices that quality competition remains significant (p179), and for spare parts that both price and
quality competition remain in a limited way (p305).  Car distributors are described as being hostages
to the manufacturers with no commercial freedom left (p291).   In those cases, the arguments used
by the Commission would thus appear to be more related to  behavioral issues.   For cement and car
importers, the situation is different ; in these cases, the Commission has described in some details
price differences across countries (p280) and has also considered costs, innovation and profits in the
case of cement.  It is remarkable that the Commission has avoided giving prominence to the
evaluation of  profits.  This is, in our view, highly appropriate given that evidence on profits is very
hard to interpret (low profits - high cost and the quiet life are probably the best of monopoly rents).
In the Cement market,  the Cartel Commission did look both at profits but, very wisely, in35
connection with evidence on costs and prices relative to EC countries.   Yet, the reasoning of the
Commission is striking.   The Commission concluded that the prices in Switzerland  were not out of
line with EC  levels  (but it still writes (p. 109) that: « the price level is high, but not arbitrarily
high. »).  On the basis of expert evidence, the  Commission also concluded that the cartel does not
lead to economically unjustified profits (p. 90) and that cost-levels correspond to Swiss norms.  It is
somewhat puzzling that on the basis of evidence that profits were not excessive and that cost and
price were not of line with EC levels,  it still concluded that effective competition on the market was
impeded.   Maybe the Commission thought that the EC markets were also cartellized.  But then, EC
benchmarks should have been explicitly dismissed.
A number of remarks are in order:
-First, the analysis of effective competition considers a number of factors that are clearly relevant to
the anti-trust evaluation of a market position.  For instance, the behavioural test effectively verifies
the market share of the firms under review, whereas the structural test does by and large focus on the
entry conditions and potential competition.   But many considerations are missing and the analysis
clearly lacks some organising principles.  It is striking in this regard that the behavioral test has little to
do with behavior, that the structural test omits the obvious structural indicators and the the outcome
test has often more to do with behavior than outcomes.   Furthermore, it is not clear why the
Commission has dismissed the approach used by many jurisdictions (like the EC), which starts from
an evaluation of concentration and further considers the relevants factors which may reduce the
extent to which market power can be excercised by firms with significant market shares.
-Second, it is striking that the analysis remains both highly informal and highly general.  For instance,
there is no information on the market share of banks that are members of the cartels on various
product markets.  Similarly,  there is no information on the strength of remaining competitors (are
they fragmented?). In the report on banks for example, the Cartel Commission does not mention the
competition that the Swiss banks face from the Post office, for small customers current and savings
accounts.  Yet,  the PTT can be expected to exert strong pressure on conditions the banks have to
offer the small customers. (The frequent public interventions by the Swiss Bankers Association with36
the aim of inducing the  PTT to reduce the interest rate they pay on their deposit account stromgly
corroborates this view.)
-Third, a number of rather strong evaluations are not backed by appropriate evidence.  For instance,
much faith is given to the idea of collective dominance in the case of car importers, without further
comment.  Given that the concept of collective dominance is controversial in other jurisdictions (see
e.g. the Nestlé-Perrier decision by the MTF), it would be interesting to know whether the
Commission had any evidence (or suspicions) about price fixing between the different importers or
indeed, whether they considered the fact that some large importers import several different brands an
important impediment to competition.  The statement in the case of cement that « possibilities of
import substitution exist only at a potential level, and to such a theoretical extent that they have not
real effect except the price limiting effect mentioned above » is surely worth supporting by a bit of
evidence, in light of the fact that Swiss cement prices are not out of line with European ones.  The
strong emphasis on intra-brand competition being necessary to maintain effective competition in the
car market is also highly debatable and could have been supported by appropriate data.
- Finally, and most importantly, there is little in the Commission’s analysis which helps defining a
threshold for restraints of competition without redemption.  What the Commission effectively does is
to analyse the market situation in rather informal term and puts forward a judgement on whether
effective competition has been impeded.   It is hard from the existing case law to deduce a number of
factors that could help in determining the threshold in the future23.  On the basis of this evidence, one
can raise some doubt about the usefulness of the approach.
Overall, one cannot help concluding that the analyis of dominance undertaken by the Commission is
somewhat muddled and often highly judgmental,  even when clear alternatives were available.
Surely, this is yet another symptom of weak accountability.
                                                                
23 The secretariat of the Commission has indicated in private communication that effective competition was
impeded in the case of agreements fixing price, quotas and contingents.  These are indeed the agreements that
have become « quasi » per se illegal under the new law.  Still,  the new law opens the possibility (art 5) that other37
2.3. The evaluation of countervailing benefits
The 1962 law did not give the Cartel Commission much guidance as to how it should analyse
markets and according to what criteria it should formulate its recommendations.  From art. 5 it was
however clear that a wide variety of social and economic benefits could be appealed to, for justifying
a cartel.24   It is of course an exceedingly complex task to perform a complete cost benefit analysis
taking into account not just narrow performance criteria, but also the impact on the labour market,
environmental economics, regional economics. The Cartel Commission reacted to this situation by
developing the so called «  balance method » which can be described as follows:  first the
commission decided which effects were important, and which were not. This initial choice (which
may be crucial) is typically not justified.   In a second step,  the Commission granted a positive mark
if the effect was beneficial, and a negative one  if it was not.   Finally the Cartel Commission added
up the marks to determine whether the beneficial effects outweighed the negative ones.
This procedure is akin to constructing an unweighted mean between variables that may be different
by orders of magnitude.   Some illustrations of this approach, admittedly from the period before
the first revision of the law, belong more to the economic folkore than professional analysis : for
example the exceedingly high prices for pharmaceuticals in Switzerland (documented by the report)
were compensated by the fact that it prevented over-consumption of these same pharmaceuticals
(1981). Similarly retail price maintenance for tobacco was considered acceptable because the high
prices this produced was more than compensated for by a) less tobacco consumption, b) greater
profits for small retailers including kiosks, which c) permitted a denser distribution of newspapers.
One can raise serious doubts about the usefulness of this procedure.  The evaluation of countervailing
benefits is, in all jurisdictions that practice it, a difficult exercise, which is somewhat arbitrary.
Nevertheless, the simple minded addition of positive and negative signs, which is unusual by
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
types of agreements might suppress effective competition.   Little guidance is offered by the case law (or the
secretariat) about these other agreements.
24 For example the idea of « promoting a desirable structure in the general interest «  can  be (and was) given a
very wide interpretation.38
comparison with other jurisdictions,  presumably does not temper the arbitrary character of the
procedure.
When the 1985 law was introduced, the new art. 29 specified in somewhat greater detail the criteria
the Cartel Commission should take into account in writing its reports: Unfortunately the list of criteria
contained a mixture of structure and performance criteria as well as variables that are not usually
considered to be relevant for competition policy (such as regional impact). This legal framework
made it difficult for the Cartel Commission to produce sound economic analysis while respecting the
letter of the law. The Cartel Commission reacted to this absence of a well structured legal constraint
by maintaining it use of the « balance method ». The main innovation was thus as follows: since art.
29 explicitly mentioned that the Cartel Commission should take into account the effects the cartel had
on « the freedom of competition and the extent of competition » these two concepts were explicitly
introduced in the « balance ». From a purely technical point of view the change to the « balance
method » was thus as follows: Every clause of a cartel agreement was now analysed first  in terms of
its effect on the « freedom of competition » and the « extent of competition ». This means that most
clauses start off with one or two negative marks, which then have to be compensated by a sufficiently
large number of positive ones. (The procedure is particularly well illustrated in the report on the
banking cartel (1989)).   From this prospective, the 1985 law was more pro-competitive than the
1962 law, because most agreements started off with one or two negative marks.
The report on banking can serve to illustrate the point.  The following excerpt concerns a convention
with the aim of preventing inappropriate and aggressive advertising (in particular advertising on
television):
« Balance: Since one of the parameters of competition, advertising, is limited in important areas, the
extent of competition is considerably reduced (negative effect). In particular sponsoring allows the
big banks to be everywhere present. As a result of advertising in sports, they also succeed- in spite
of article 9, number 2 of the convention - in being present on television. As a result there is a
distortion of competition which reduces the competitive position of smaller banks (negative effect).
The restrictions on competition further distort the choice between various  means of advertising and39
prevent isolated banks from having access to customers in an adequate form (negative element).
The influences on other criteria are considered to be neutral. »
On the basis of this analysis the Cartel Commission recommended the suppression of the relevant
convention.
One may wonder whether the legislator really intended the Cartel Commission to continue using the
« balance method ».  The Cartel Commission did write (in the report on banks) : « The analysis of
the individual agreements follows a certain procedure determined by the cartel law. .....If we observe
a substantial impediment to competition, but effective competition is not prevented the positive and
negative effects have to be compared according to the balance sheet method. » (pp 64-66).  Yet,
the law itself did not compel the Commission to follow the balance method.  The Commission could
have adopted a different interpretation of the law and decided to focus mostly on efficiency criteria
and to abandon the simple minded addition of positive and negative marks.  In other words, the
Commission could have used the wide discretion offered by the law to steer the analysis away from
the previous practice and in favour a less arbitrary evaluation.
Why did the Commission not follow this course of action.  Three motivations come to mind. First,
the « balance method » was a simple way to directly translate the requirements on « freedom of
competition » and « extent of competition » into a bias in favour of competition and stack the cards
against the cartel agreement, even if the cartel was difficult to challenge on performance criteria
alone. Second, any institution is affected by some inertia, and  the staff of the Cartel Commission
which had experience with the « balance method », may have been tempted to simply carry on.
Finally, one cannot help noticing that the commission and its secretariat are heavily biased in favour
of legal experts, which presumably would not have felt at ease with a more demanding economic
analysis. (At the time of the report on the banking cartel for example, the president, the vice
president and two of the members of the commission were professors of law. There was not a single
professor of economics. In the secretariat, of the 8 members, seven had a law degree, only one was
an economist and one had a degree in both diciplines.)40
The new law clearly states that the commission should place much of the emphasis of its studies on
economic efficiency.   One can only hope that the Commission will now change its practice, abandon
the simple minded addition of marks and focus on a quantitative analysis of a narrow set of well
defined efficiency benefits.   As the experience of  other jurisdiction indicates, this can be done even
if it is by no means a straightforward exercise.  First, some effects are very difficult to quantify and
firms will be tempted to overemphasise their claim of  efficiency benefits.  In arguing about efficiency,
firms will also typically have more resources than the Commission (for instance  in order to hire
consultants to make their case).  These problems have been encountered in many jurisdictions and
addressed in different ways.  The attitude of US authorities is interesting  in this regard ; they have
(see for instance the US merger guidelines) narrowed down the set of efficiency considerations that
they are willing to consider by focusing on easily verifiable claims.  For instance, claims about
potential savings in general administration in the case of a joint  venture (or a merger) are not given
serious considerations relative to potential benefits associated with the consolidation of production
units.  It seems that  the Cartel Commission should be encouraged to adopt an approach similar to
that of the US authorities.
2.4. Fairness and market power
The proper distinction between issues of market power and fairness is a major difficulty faced by all
anti-trust authorities.  To illustrate,  consider first a (highly theoretical) world in which we have
textbook « perfect competition ». In such an economy every seller (or buyer) is faced with a large
number of alternatives firms buying (or selling ) close substitutes to the product which he is currently
buying (selling).  It is thus impossible for any one of the buyers (sellers) to have an important degree
of market power over his counterpart. Any attempt to modify the terms of exchange would induce
the party who is made worse off to change partner.
In practice, the number of firms producing perfect or even close substitutes is usually quite limited.  In
addition, firms frequently have to incur some fixed costs that are to a certain extent specific to
particular commercial relations and accordingly these fixed costs should be seen as sunk.   In the
absence of (complete) long term contracts,  this situation gives rise to the possibility of opportunistic
behaviour.41
The dominant tradition among economists is to consider that market power and competition should
be the sole focus of competition policy.  That the enforcement of competition leads to more
« equitable » outcome is seen as a beneficial side effect, but certainly not a purpose as such.
Legal statutes are however often (and rightly) concerned with issues of fairness.  It is thus not
surprising that legal practitioners have a tendency to adopt the same perspective with respect to
competition policy.  They observe situations where the outcome of market processes is (in their
opinion) unfair, conclude that the exploiting party must have market power, and use competition
policy to solve the « problem ».
A well known example of such a case at the EC level is the « Hugin » case. Very briefly, Hugin is a
Swedish producer of cash register machines. It is undisputed that there is intense competition on this
market.  In the middle of the 70s, Hugin decided to stop out-sourcing the repairs and servicing of
their machines, and to take care of these activities themselves . As a result, they refused to supply
spare parts to Liptons, their former repair agent. Liptons did not have a long term contract with
Hugin, so there was no breach of contract. It is obvious that the decision by Hugin could (potentially)
cause a (substantial) financial loss to Liptons.  At the very least the specific human capital they had
acquired for the repair of Hugin cash registers would have become worthless. Liptons complained to
the EEC and won. The commission decided that Hugin had a dominant position in the market for
spare parts for Hugin cash registers. Cancelling the contract with Liptons was therefore an abuse of a
dominant position.
The problem in this case was that Liptons had a certain amount of relation specific capital tied up
with Hugin. They had decided to invest this capital without requiring a long term contract from Hugin.
The EEC Commission decided to use competition policy instruments to solve a problem, which is
basically one of opportunistic behaviour in the presence of relation  specific sunk costs.  Most
economists would say that the instruments have been subverted.
As indicated above, the Swiss legal framework has so far steered clear of abusing competition law
for the purposes of solving issues of fairness. Judgement on the practice is however somewhat more42
nuanced. According to art. 29 of the 1985 law,  the Cartel Commission could make propositions to
cartels (or analogous organisations) that the Minister of economics could be asked to enforce,  but
the law sets no restrictions as to the nature of these suggestions.  An analysis of these
recommendations (see next section) suggests that the Cartel Commission has developed a tendency
to use remedies which go far beyond competition issues and address issues of fairness.
The following examples may illustrate the point:
-The market for food retailing in Switzerland is notably concentrated, with MIGROS having a
market share of approx. 40% and the COOP a market share of approx. 30%.  There is no other
country in Europe where the retailing market even approaches this very high degree of concentration.
The Cartel Commission has never undertaken anything to prevent the external growth of these two
firms.  But of course, both the COOP and the MIGROS have always had « their »  representative in
the Cartel Commission.
About a year ago some of the suppliers to DENNER, with a market share of roughly 6% (i.e. one
5th of the size of COOP), complained that DENNER was forcing them to accept unfair conditions
of supply. The Cartel Commission accepted to handle the complaint and it is currently studying the
case.  The complaint should presumably have been dismissed simply on the basis of the argument
that DENNER could not possibly have a dominant position, since the dominant positions were
already occupied by MIGROS and COOP25.   If a decision of infringement for abuse of dominance
is taken against DENNER (despite its small market share), it will set a  worrying precedent.   The
Commission could then be dragged into the evaluation of  countless negotiations between strong and
weak parties with do not involve issues of market power.
The case is all the more noteworthy, since the suppliers to DENNER cannot presumably even make
a strong case that they have invested substantial amounts in relation specific sunk costs.
                                                                
25  Denner refused to supply evidence and the matter was brought  by the Federal Commission in front of the
Federal Court.  The Court directed Denner to provide evidence and indicated that a market share of 6% was not a
sufficient condition to dismiss the possibility of a dominant position.43
- A second case, which is perhaps economically less important but also quite indicative is the report
on the SMASH Tennis magazine. Smash is edited by a private publisher but is under strong control
of the Swiss tennis federation, since the clubs affiliated to the federation are forced to buy about 2/3
of the total 30’000 copies printed. In exchange the magazine acts as an official media  of the
federation, which has 4-6 pages at its disposal in every issue.
Problems arose when the magazine refused to publish advertisements by a discount retailer of  tennis
rackets. The discounter complained to the Cartel Commission. In its analysis of the case the Cartel
Commission reached the conclusion that SMASH had a dominant position in a very narrow market
(see above) and had abused its position.
We have strong sympathy with the desire of the commission to make market access easy for
discounters.  As indicated above, it is however not at all clear that such a narrow market definition is
warranted.  One cannot help speculating that the choice of such a narrow definition was in part
determined by the desire to justify an intervention in order to achieve a market outcome that the
Cartel Commission deemed fair.
2.5. Remedies
When the Cartel Commission has decided that effective competition has been impeded, or that the
negative effects of the cartel outweighs the benefits, it has to propose remedies.    The aim of the
remedies is usually (for instance in the EC) to make sure that competition is enhanced.   Typical
remedies include the cancellation of some agreements,  partial divestments, the facilitation of entry,
the cancellation of some vertical linkages... (see Bellamy and Child, 1993, for the EC practice).   The
Swiss cartel  commission has developed a practice  which goes well beyond these remedies and
provides advice to the market participants on how they should behave. A particularly clear example
is the following recommendation the Commission made to the banks (p173):
« The big banks should continue to show moderation in opening new branch offices , at least as far
as reinforcing their position on certain local markets is concerned. »44
« The big banks should not use their possibilities of internal return compensation in order to make
particularly attractive offers and thus penetrate the traditional spheres of activity of the canton banks,
the regional banks, the savings and Raiffeisen banks, particularly as concerns the market for small
mortgages. »
While it is true that this advice stems from a report of 1979 (i.e. written under the first cartel law), the
1989 report explicitly reproduced theses recommendations as adequate if  dismantling the cartel
agreements led to too rapid a process of concentration.
- The case of sanitary equipment had all the characteristics of the traditional Swiss cartel.   A cartel
at the whole-sale level, a cartel of producers and importers, and exclusive buying (selling)
agreements between the two, which stabilised the cartels. (The wholesaler promised not to buy from
other producers and in counterpart the producers promised not to sell outside cartel)
In addition to recommending (quite rightly)  the break up of the two cartels as well as the vertical
restraints between them, the Cartel Commission then went on to make the following recommendation
to the biggest Swiss producers:
« Céramique Holding SA, Laufon, is obliged to supply all its sanitary equipment to all shops
specialised in sanitary equipment, as long as the customer buys by full lorries. The standard articles
must be taken by full pallets, while specialised article can be taken by mixed pallets, or exceptionally
by single units. A minimum turnover of 150’000 SFr. is necessary to have the right to delivery. »
The  recommendation made to the second big producer is essentially similar in content.
These two examples  indicate that the Cartel Commission has a tendency to undertake what might be
termed «  industrial engineering », a task which goes far beyond what is necessary to enforce
competition law (see also the recent  « codes of conduct » edicted by the Commission for Publicitas
and Edipress, which corroborate this view).45
The considerable latitude enjoyed by the Cartel Commission in the definition of remedies stemmed
from  art. 29 of the 1995 law which did not constrain the Commission in making recommendation.
The new law may turn out to offer less latitude to the Commission.  First, art 5 (for agreements) is
more specific both about illegal practices and about countervailing benefits.   It may thus be harder
for the Commission to justify detailed intervention beyond cancellation of the practice found illegal.
Second, as indicated above, the threat of direct judicial review of the Commission decision which
was absent under the 85 law, should induce a somewhat more prudent behaviour. One can indeed
presume that detailed industrial engineering would be among the first types of decisions to be
challenged in court.
3.  Conclusions
A number of conclusions emerge from our review of Swiss competition policy.
First, the new law (1995) is in many ways a substantial improvement over its predecessor.  In
particular, the institutional arrangements for the implementation of the policy are likely to offer much
better guarantees of  accountability and independence from outside pressure.  In our view, one of the
main shortcoming of the previous institutional and legal arrangements  was the poor accountability of
the Commission and its vulnerability to interest groups.   The introduction of direct judicial review of
the Commission decision should greatly enhance accountability and balance the wide powers
enjoyed by the commission.  In addition, the vulnerability of the Commission with respect to outside
pressure has been reduced.  The change in its composition and the new status of the secretariat are
particularly significant in this regard.  One can regret that the conditions of publication of Commission
decision have not been strengthened.  In our view, publication should be compulsory and not at the
discretion of the Commission.
Second, the substance of the new law has also improved.   In particular, the much criticised method
of the « balance » will hopefully no longer be used and will be replaced by systematic evaluation of
narrow efficiency benefits, the definition of  per se unlawful agreements has been made more precise,
specific provisions for abuse of dominance and a merger law have been introduced.  Overall, the
main provisions of the law have converged significantly towards EC law.   Besides relatively minor46
issues (for instance, the merger law could have been stronger),  the new law has, in our view,  one
important shortcoming ; it is still structured around the concept of effective competition.  This
concept  has been kept from the previous law, where in our view, it has not proved useful.   The idea
of defining a threshold beyond which restrains of competition are without redemption might be
intellectually appealing.  But the case law has failed to bring the concept to life.     With respect to
agreements, we would argue that the Competition Commission should place little emphasis on the
concept.  After all, the new law also contains some « quasi » per se prohibitions which may be quite
sufficient to cover abuses without redemption.  Indeed, if the Commission would choose to neglect
the concept of effective competition, its statute with respect to agreements would become effectively
like  art 85 & 1 and 3 of the treaty.   With respect to mergers, the concept of effective competition is
less central and the practice (as in the EC) could choose not to emphasise it.
Third,  the case law suggests that the Commission has not resisted the temptation to get involved in
issues of fairness, even though the statutes are remarkably neutral in this regard.  In our view, this
tendency should be checked.  A clear distinction between anti-trust and fairness issues would
enhance legal certainty and enable the Commission to focus on its primary function, namely to ensure
competition.   If  it is felt by appropriate legislative and executive bodies that intervention for the sake
of fairness is essential for the functioning of the economy,  these issues could be handled by another
institution, on the basis of a separate statute.   This might be an adequate role for the price
supervisor.
Fourth, in the course of this review, we have become acutely aware that the Commission has played
an unusual role.  Rather than implementing a « competition policy », it has striven to implement a
« policy towards competition ».   The Commission has systematically tried to introduce competition
in the Swiss economy and has stretched its mandate in order to achieve this.  The report on the car
industry is a case in point.   The issue in the report is not one of  anti-trust policy (there is  no cartel,
no agreement, no abuse, no merger) but one of  international price discrimination facilitated by
domestic regulations.   Yet, the Commission has stretched its analysis (for instance by insisting on
intra-brand competition) to make sure that it could recommend the opening of the market.   In the
same way that  the EC Commission has used art 85/86 of the Treaty to ensure market integration
proactively , the Swiss Cartel Commission has used its competition statute proactively to introduce47
competition and break cartel habits in Switzerland.   Of course, this objective may have been
reasonable in view of the highly cartellised structure of the Swiss economy.   But, for the sake of
legal certainty and transparency, a more focused policy may be more appropriate.
Indeed, the competition Commission may not longer have much choice in the matter.  In our view,
the emphasis of a  pro-active use of the law to introduce competition was greatly facilitated by the
wide powers and weak accountability  enjoyed by the Commission under the 85 law.  As indicated
above, matters are different under the new law.   The challenge for the Commission is now to refocus
its activities on more traditional antitrust issues.48
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